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Abstract 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Corruption, the abuse of public power for private gain, can impose an additional cost on many 
transactions and activities. Fisman and Svensson (2007) point out that corruption could act like a 
tax or on the other hand it may help (some) firms to overcome excessive bureaucracy and red 
tape. For example, Mendoza et al (2015) find that in the case of SMEs in the Philippines 
corruption greases the wheels of economic activity. Corruption has also been found to be 
negatively associated with many macroeconomic conditions, the presence of which could 
discourage foreign investment. In addition, O'Toole and Tarp (2014) demonstrate that corruption 
lowers the efficiency of capital investment.  Foreign investors, like domestic investors, will take 
account of these costs when making their investment decisions. 
 
This paper contributes to a long standing literature that has tended to find that corruption, as 
measured by expert’s perceptions, is detrimental in terms of a country’s foreign direct investment 
(FDI) performance. We allow both perceptions of corruption and firms’ experiences of 
corruption to enter into an empirical FDI model as separate and distinct variables. After 
illustrating that these variables can tell very different stories about the extent of corruption in a 
country, we show that perceptions based measures are strongly associated with FDI while 
experience based measures are not, even when perceptions are not included in the model. 
However, we do find some evidence that experiences trump perceptions when it comes to 
greenfield investment. 
 
Until relatively recently, corruption has been measured and compared internationally using 
measures that are, for the most part, based on the perceptions of experts. However, recent years 
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have seen the emergence of large survey based datasets that contain corruption indicators based 
on the experiences of firms. While perception based indicators have allowed academics to 
understand corruption better and helped the media to shine a light on corruption, researchers 
have long been aware of the shortcomings inherent in such measures. Svensson (2003), Reinikka 
and Svensson (2006), Treisman (2007), and Fan, Lin and Treisman (2009) all raise concerns that 
perception indices are likely to suffer from perception biases. Knack (2007) and Kenny (2009) 
suggest that perception indicators lag reality. On the other hand, experience based measures from 
appropriately designed surveys can yield “hard evidence on corruption” (Svensson (2005)). 
Knack (2007) stresses that survey based measures can “place a greater emphasis on experience 
and less on perceptions” (p. 257) and that “[i]n contrast to most expert assessments, surveys of 
firms and households generate data likely to be largely independent from other judgments” (p. 
266). Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010) compare individuals’ experiences of corruption with a 
survey of experts’ opinions for Sub-Saharan Africa and conclude that there are differences 
between the two and that there are ideological and cultural biases in the experts’ evaluations of 
corruption. 
 
There is a large empirical literature that examines the effect of corruption on FDI, mostly using 
perceptions based indicators. Wei (2000a) studies the effect of corruption on FDI using bilateral 
investment data and finds that corruption reduces FDI significantly and substantially. Wei 
(2000b) finds that corruption plays a role in shaping both the composition of the FDI that a 
country receives and the magnitude. Hakkala, Nörback and Svaleryd (2008) use firm level data 
from Sweden to show that higher corruption in a country reduces the probability that a firm will 
invest there. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) examine the effect of corruption in the host and 
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receiving countries on FDI. They find a negative effect of host country corruption and of the 
difference between corruption levels between the host and receiving countries on FDI. Egger and 
Winner (2006) examine outward FDI stocks of OECD countries and find that the overall effect 
of corruption is negative. Mishra and Daly (2007) find that institutional and bureaucratic quality 
in host countries are important determinants of FDI.  Busse and Hefeker (2007) also find that 
institutional quality matters for FDI though they find a weaker relationship between corruption 
and FDI flows than with other political factors such as government stability, conflicts, law and 
order, ethnic tensions and bureaucratic quality. Atems and Mullen (2016) study US outward FDI 
and find that corruption in the host country discourages investment although they also find that 
money laundering possibilities attract investment.  
 
At the subnational level, Cole, Elliott and Zhang (2009) find that FDI is more attracted to 
Chinese provinces that are actively fighting against corruption. Ledyaeva, Karhunen and 
Kosonen (2013) study Russian regions and find that foreign investors tend to pick regions that 
are similar to their host countries in terms of where they are on the (relative) corruption and 
democracy spectra. A related contribution is provided by Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol 
(2012) who conclude that “increased FDI under political stability and low corruption has the 
greatest impact on increasing total private investment”.  
 
Not all of the literature has used perceptions based measures of corruption. An important and 
particularly relevant contribution is provided by Javorcik and Wei (2009) who show that their 
firm level results regarding the importance of corruption for both the entry mode and level of 
FDI are robust to using a corruption measure based on a survey of firms. While our findings 
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might seem to be in direct opposition to theirs, it should be borne in mind that they study 262 
firms investing in Europe and Central Asia and do not include perceptions and experiences 
simultaneously. Using survey data of French civil servants Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet and Mayer 
(2007) study the impact of institutional quality on bilateral FDI. They find that corruption is 
important alongside measures of the quality of banking sector and general legal institutions. 
Daude and Stein (2007) also study the effect of institutional quality on FDI. They point out that 
indicators based on expert evaluations on one hand and surveys on the other hand might yield 
different results. They find that a survey based measure of corruption similar to one that we 
employ in this paper is insignificant though they do not include perceptions and this measure at 
the same time. They also fail to find a significant effect of the standard corruption measures on 
FDI which puts them at odds with much of the literature. 
 
This is just a small sample of this literature consisting of the most relevant and important papers. 
The weight of evidence suggests that corruption is undesirable in terms of attracting FDI, though 
there are some papers that fail to find a relationship such as Daude and Stein (2007) while Egger 
and Winner (2005) find that corruption is beneficial in terms of FDI in both the short and long 
run. This paper clearly builds on this literature by asking whether perceptions of corruption, the 
reality of corruption, or both matter for FDI. 
 
When perceptions differ from the experiences of firms, which should matter? Should one matter 
more than the other? These are empirical questions but we can think of reasons as to why each 
could matter. The experience based measures are probably the more relevant of the two in that 
they capture the actual situation faced by firms and they are exclusively concerned with firms 
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whereas the other measures may pick up corruption that affects individuals. However, the 
perceptions measures, particularly the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which receives a lot 
of media attention and is easily accessed in a user friendly way, are perhaps the data that foreign 
investors actually see.  
 
Results from other literatures offers little guidance as to which we should expect to matter. 
Gillanders (2014) finds that both perceptions based measures and experience based measures 
individually predict infrastructure quality. However, Aidt (2009) shows that when you switch 
from perceptions to experience based measures the links between corruption and economic 
growth disappear (though he only has an experience based measure for 1999-2000 and uses this 
to explain growth from 1970-2000). It is therefore important to note that the context may matter. 
Different underlying mechanisms and decision making processes are likely to result in different 
conclusions regarding the importance and relative importance of perceptions and experience 
based measures. 
 
We begin by outlining the data used and then show that perceptions can differ from experience in 
many cases. Section 4 shows that perceptions are significantly and meaningfully associated with 
good FDI outcomes in general while the experience based measures are not, though greenfield 
investment may be different. Section 5 concludes and briefly discusses the implications of these 
findings for policy and the caveats to the analysis. 
 
2 DATA 
In this section we define and discuss our dependent variables and independent variables of 
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interest. Table A1 in the appendix gives definitions and sources for all the variables used in our 
analysis. We obtained our information on FDI from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) database. The UNCTAD database methodology defines FDI inflows 
as “an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control 
by a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise 
resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate 
enterprise or foreign affiliate).”1 
Our main measure of FDI is net FDI inflows. This consists of the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings or intra-company loans or debt. The inflow data is recorded in net terms 
implying that if net FDI inflows appear negative, at least one of its three components is negative 
and is not offset by positive amounts of the other components. We also examine the net values of 
greenfield investments and M&A (Mergers & Acquisitions) sales by destination country, which 
are also obtained from the UNCTAD database. Greenfield investments are investments that 
entail operations built from zero, or in other words the foreign entity does not acquire a share in 
an existing company in the host country.  The value of Greenfield investments are collected by 
fDi markets of the Financial Times for UNCTAD. The greenfield data may include investments 
that are not qualified as FDI because information on the equity share is not always available.  In 
addition, the UNCTAD methodological annex states that in the greenfield data “joint-ventures 
are also included only where they lead to a new physical operation. While there is no minimum 
size for a project to be included, as a selection criteria for inclusion in this database an 
investment project has to create new direct jobs and capital investment” (UNCTAD WIR 2013, 
p. 66). M&A investments on the other hand are the net sum of sales of existing companies or 
shares in them. The information in the UNCTAD cross-border M&A statistics are collected by 
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Thomson Reuters. The M&A data consist of the values of equity sales as well as the purchases 
via domestic and international capital markets, which should not be considered as FDI flows. 
Therefore, the M&A statistics correspond to the definition of FDI only in the case of equity 
sales. All data were converted to constant 2005 US$. 
 
The most widely used measure of corruption is the Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI), which gives countries a score on their perceived corruption from 10 
(highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt).2 The CPI is primarily based on expert views and according 
to the CPI 2013 methodology the index is based on information “drawn from data sources of 
independent institutions specializing in governance and business climate analysis”.3 Some of 
these sources are based on surveys of “business leaders” in the country. For example, the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook survey of senior business leaders. However, the sample size of these 
surveys tend to be somewhat small, they are unlikely to be representative, and most such sources 
only cover a small number of countries.4 
 
As we saw in Section 1 above, leading scholars of corruption have expressed several concerns 
about perceptions measures. Fan, Lin and Treisman (2009, 15) capture perfectly what is perhaps 
the chief concern of corruption researchers regarding perceptions based measures: 
 
“…perceived corruption indices … rely on the aggregated perceptions of businessmen or country 
experts, many of whom may have formed impressions – perhaps subconsciously – based on 
common press depictions of countries or conventional notions about what institutions or cultures 
are conducive to corruption.” 
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They support this assertion with the findings of Treisman (2007) that while characteristics such 
as the extent of democracy, press freedom, oil rents, and the percentage of women in government 
can explain variation in perceptions of corruption, once one controls for income these factors do 
not explain experience based measures. Fan, Lin and Treisman (2009, p. 15) suggest that “the 
businessmen and experts whose perceptions are being tapped might be inferring corruption levels 
from its hypothesized causes”. 
 
Such perception biases have also been alluded to by other scholars of corruption (e.g. Svensson 
(2003) and Reinikka and Svensson (2006)) and have been shown to exist in the case of Sub-
Saharan Africa by Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010), but other issues have also been raised. 
For example, Knack (2007) points out that composite indices have no explicit definition due to 
the many, often quite different, sources used to create them and that the implicit definition 
changes over time as the source information changes. Both Knack (2007) and Kenny (2009) 
argue that changes in perceptions based measures tend to lag reality “if they have anything to do 
with reality at all” (Knack 2007, p. 265). 
 
Thus while traditional perceptions/composite indicators have served researchers, policymakers 
and journalists well in the past, there are strong reasons to seek alternative measures that are less 
likely to suffer from these perception biases and other issues. For researchers interested in 
international comparisons, evidence from well-designed standardised surveys can provide 
batteries of interesting corruption measures. Svensson (2005) and Reinikka and Svensson (2006) 
argue that properly conducted surveys of firms can provide reliable “hard” evidence on 
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corruption. Knack (2007) argues that such exercises can yield measures of corruption that are 
based on the experience of corruption rather than perceptions and that are less likely to be 
influenced by other judgements and the judgements of others.  
 
The World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (ES) contain a wide range of information on firms in the 
manufacturing and service sectors in a wide range of countries. The ES are representative firm 
level surveys that employ stratified random sampling.5 They are carefully designed and 
implemented and have been much used in recent years by researchers interested in corruption as 
they ask several questions about firms’ experiences of corruption. We use three variables from 
the ES macro dataset to measure corruption. Each is somewhat different and thus, if they are in 
agreement, we can have more confidence in our findings. 
 
The three ES corruption measures that we use are the percent of firms that see corruption as a 
major constraint to their business (Constraint), the percent of public transactions where a gift or 
informal payment was requested (Depth) and the percent of firms that are expected to give gifts 
to public officials "to get things done" (Gifts). Each of these variables takes a slightly different 
approach to measuring corruption. Constraint comes from a question that asks respondents if 
corruption is no obstacle, a minor obstacle, major obstacle, or a very severe obstacle to the 
current operations of their establishment. The vagueness of this question is part of its appeal. It 
does not ask specifically about specific bribe amounts or frequencies which people may 
intentionally or unintentionally misreport. Besides this, corruption can manifest itself in ways 
other than bribes. Constraint could be viewed as a measure of firms’ perceptions of corruption 
but it is still a perception that is based on their experiences. In addition, we use two variables that 
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focus on bribery as the main modality of corruption. Depth and Gifts differ though in that the 
former asks directly about the respondent’s own firm, as does Constraint, while the latter was 
compiled from answers referring to a “firm with similar characteristics to yours.” This is done to 
draw out honest answers. Thus we have a set of indicators based on firm’s experiences that are 
each subtly different from the others. Depth and Gifts are strongly correlated with each other 
(0.78) while Constraint has a weak correlation (0.23 and 0.14) with the two other experience 
based measures.  
Our combined dataset includes 135 different countries and covers years from 2002 to 2013. The 
countries in the survey are, however, very unevenly represented during the eleven years of yearly 
survey rounds and the resulting panel data is very unbalanced. Table 1 presents summary 
statistics for the main variables. 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
3 DO PERCEPTIONS MATCH EXPERIENCES? 
In this section we show that the conclusions one might draw from perceptions measures can be 
very different from the story according to experience based measures. Treisman (2007) found 
somewhat strong correlations between perceptions based measures and experience based 
measures (roughly between 0.6 and 0.8) though he notes that the correlation is weaker if one 
focuses on developing countries. We find weaker correlations between our perceptions and 
experience based measures (between 0.40 and 0.52) and when we examine the data visually we 
can see many countries that seem to have undeserved reputations – at least by these metrics. 
<FIGURE 1 HERE> 
<FIGURE 2 HERE> 
<FIGURE 3 HERE> 
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Figures 1, 2 and 3 show that the CPI and measures based on firms reported experiences can tell 
quite different stories about the corruption situation in a country.6 Countries are divided into 
groups defined by the sample means. Immediately one can see that there exist a significant 
number of countries with an unearned corruption reputation either in that they are perceived as 
relatively corrupt but are not according to firms’ actual experiences or are perceived as “clean” 
but are not according to firms’ experiences.7 In addition, some interesting geographical patterns 
exist. For example, much of Africa (except for the very south) is perceived to be corrupt however 
perceptions do not match reality in many parts of East-Africa. Clusters can also be observed in 
Europe. For the most part in Western European and EU countries perceptions of low corruption 
match the experience based measures. However, some newly acceded EU countries and Balkans 
countries have low perceptions of corruption but are relatively corrupt by the Constraint 
measure.  This could indicate that these countries are benefiting in terms of perceptions from the 
proximity of very clean countries and possibly EU membership even though firms feel that 
corruption is constraining their operations.  
 
Amongst Asian countries in general it is hard to see any common patterns. Many of the Central 
Asian countries in our sample are perceived to be corrupt and this is largely in agreement with 
the experience based measures. Central and Latin American countries, however, show 
considerable disagreement both between perceptions and experience measures and also between 
different experience measures. This discrepancy could indicate that firms in Central and Latin 
American countries do not see giving gifts or paying bribes as a constraint or these more 
traditional forms of corruption are very limited in scale and that firms are plagued by other more 
subtle forms of corruption (such as nepotism or old boy networks). Similar differences between 
12 
 
the different experience based indicators can be seen in Turkey and the Balkans, which share a 
long common history under the former Ottoman Empire.  
 
Figures 4, 5, and 6 present the data in a slightly different way. These figures are divided into four 
quadrants defined by the sample means. One can see the numbers for each country side by side 
and get a better sense of the magnitude of any discrepancy between perceptions and experiences 
of corruption. These figures also allow one to get some sense of the year-to-year variability in 
the experience of corruption metrics for those countries with repeated observations (though we 
have not added year labels to the scatter points for want of space). Figure 4 shows us that 36% of 
firms in Chile (CHL) in 2006 felt corruption was a major constraint. This had fallen to 18% in 
2010 without there being any appreciable change in the CPI score (though there are of course 
issues with comparing CPI scores for the same country over time before 2012). Future work 
examining what determines how “sticky” these indicators are could yield interesting and 
important insights.  
<FIGURE 4 HERE> 
<FIGURE 5 HERE> 
<FIGURE 6 HERE> 
 
The conclusions one can draw from this presentation of the raw data are that there are, by the 
measures available to us, large numbers of countries that have an unearned or undeserved 
reputation for corruption and that there are “reputation blocks” of countries that share certain 
geographic and historical traits. While for the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to observe 
that differences between perceptions and experience based measures exist, the existence of these 
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clusters is very interesting and warrants further and full study. Certainly the existence of these 
blocks brings to mind the argument of Fan et al. (2009) quoted above regarding perceptions 
being driven by expectations based on culture and history rather than by actual corruption. These 
findings also tie in well with the finding of Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010) that experts may 
have a model of “how Africa works” in their minds. 
 
4 PERCEPTIONS, EXPERIENCES AND FDI 
4.1 Approach 
Having established that there is often a difference between the widely reported perceptions of 
corruption in a country and the experience of firms in that country, we ask if perceptions or 
actual experience or both matter in terms of the amount of FDI a country attracts. As outlined 
above, there is a longstanding literature that, for the most part, shows that the degree of 
corruption in a country, usually measured with a perceptions based measure, is negatively 
associated with inward FDI. 
 
To investigate the importance of perceptions and experience based measures in terms of FDI, we 
estimate models of the following general form with OLS on our unbalanced panel data: 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  Γ𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡   (1) 
where 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖 is the natural logarithm of total net inflow of FDI in country i at time t,  𝛼 is the 
intercept term,  𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 is an indicator of perceived corruption and/or experienced 
corruption, X contains different control variables described below and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is an error term of the 
standard type.  
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There are obvious endogeneity concerns one might have with this approach. For example, the 
level of FDI could influence both actual corruption and corruption perceptions. Unfortunately the 
data is not suitable for the GMM solutions that others have used and it is very difficult to think of 
valid instruments for two measures of corruption – especially in the context of a cross country 
FDI study. This is not an uncommon issue with empirical FDI papers (see e.g. Chung (2014)). 
Even though our results may not be causal, we think they will be of interest and value to policy 
makers and hope that they will serve as a starting point for further research. 
 
4.2 Main Results 
<TABLE 2 HERE> 
Table 2 presents our main results.8 The results tell us that countries with lower perceived 
corruption tend to attract more FDI. A one unit improvement in the CPI (which takes values 
from 0-10) is associated with an increase of around 20% to 24% in FDI inflows. This is clearly a 
very large “effect” but such large associations have been found by others e.g. Wei (2000a) and 
Asiedu (2006). Turning to our experience based measures of corruption, in one instance the 
experience based measure Gifts is weakly significant, however in general our experience based 
corruption measures are not significantly associated with FDI and the size of the estimated 
association is much smaller. When we include perceptions and experience based measures in the 
same regressions, the former is significant while the latter type of measure is not.  
 
Thus, these simple regressions tell a clear story. The experience of corruption, which we have 
seen can be very different from perceptions, is not an important factor in terms of a country’s 
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ability to attract FDI. Even when we exclude the perceptions measures, the experience based 
measures are not statistically significant predictors of FDI. Why might this be? As argued above, 
investors should probably care about the reality of corruption and not the perception. However, 
until recently experience based measures were hard to come by while the CPI is widely reported, 
free to access, and presented in a user-friendly way. In other words, investors concerned about 
corruption are likely to use the CPI as their metric. Another explanation is that a given operating 
environment could affect a global multinational corporation differently than a local entrepreneur. 
For example, in Russia the operating environment is not the same for all and whether a company 
is targeted can depend on informal networks (see for example Aidis and Adachi (2007)). 
Sometimes foreigners are targeted more and sometimes not.  Billon and Gillanders (forthcoming) 
show that firms with more foreign ownership do indeed face a statistically significantly lower 
burden of corruption in that they pay less in bribes and tend to find corruption to be less of a 
constraint to their operations. However, the sizes of these effects are not very large and are only 
evident in a sample of Eastern European and Central Asian economies. Thus, we tend to favour 
the first explanation though the two are not mutually exclusive. 
 
We include several important factors commonly used in the empirical FDI literature. We allow 
for trade costs to enter the specification as proxied for by the inverse of openness to international 
trade.9 To control for market size and development we include a population variable and income 
category dummies from the World Bank.10 We follow the literature (e.g. Blonigen et al. (2007)) 
and include the sum of distance weighted GDP of other countries to measure surrounding market 
potential. In line with Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) we control for the skill level in a 
country by using data on expected years of schooling. Finally we include dummies for 
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landlocked and island nations to allow for potentially important geographical considerations. All 
variables are defined fully in Table A1 in the appendix. These factors are signed as one would 
expect. Poorer countries tend to attract less in FDI than richer countries while countries with 
larger populations attract more, as do those with a more skilled work force and a larger 
surrounding market potential, though this later factor is not robustly significant. Trade costs are 
always a significant and negative correlate of FDI as is being landlocked while the island dummy 
is never significant. 
 
In the future, it will become possible, and desirable, to revisit this question armed with the full 
arsenal of panel data techniques. However even these simple correlations which are robust to the 
inclusion of other important factors tell a story that should be of great interest to policymakers. 
Surveys of firm experiences of corruption do not correlate with how much FDI a country attracts 
but the often different and potentially biased perceptions of corruption do have an association 
with these important flows. However, we want to stress that this relationship may change as 
experience based measures become more well-known.  
 
4.3 Are Greenfield and M&A Investment Different? 
One can readily imagine that different modes of investment may stand in different relation to 
different measures of corruption. Foreign investors can enter a market through buying equity 
shares in a domestic company (mergers and acquisitions or M&A investment) or build their 
operations from zero (greenfield investment). There are many reasons that could lead investors to 
favour one method of investing over the other. For example, building new operations from zero 
in a foreign country can entail more risk than acquiring an already locally established company 
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(Dikova and Witteloostuijn 2007). Another possible factor is that more R&D intensive 
companies may prefer to use greenfield investment which can reduce the likelihood of their 
innovations being transmitted unintentionally. 
 
In this section, we investigate whether the importance of experience based measures of 
corruption and perception based measures change with the mode of investment (greenfield or 
M&A). To measure these quantities, we use the net inflows of greenfield and M&A investment 
variables from UNCTAD. Globerman and Shapiro (2005) have also used UNCTAD data to 
study cross-border M&A investment and conclude that factors that are found to be influencing 
the overall levels of FDI inflows into a country might not have the same effect on all modes of 
investment. Neto, Brandão and Cerqueira (2010) have also used the same data for comparison of 
greenfield and M&A investment and they find that there are some mode-specific macroeconomic 
variables. They find for example that good governance is significant for both modes of 
establishment but that cultural distance is only important for greenfield investment. Furthermore, 
Ayça (2012) has used firm-level data on Swedish MNCs and found that perceptions based 
measures of corruption have a negative effect on greenfield investment and a weak positive 
effect on M&A investment but that the effect of corruption is alleviated by the company’s 
international experience. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of regressions using the net value of greenfield and M&A 
investment as dependent. When we exclude the experience measures, the CPI is a significant 
correlate of both types of FDI and this is also true for the most part when we include Depth and 
Gifts. However, Constraint is significantly correlated with greenfield investments though not 
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with M&A investment. When Constraint is included perceptions no longer have a significant 
association with greenfield investment. These results could arise from a tendency for firms 
engaging in greenfield investment to investigate the local situation more carefully for themselves 
as they do not have the help of already established networks and facilities that come with a 
company already in operation. Investors in a greenfield project will most likely need to assess the 
local risks more carefully anyway as this form of investment is in itself already more risky than 
M&A. Given that we do not find any significant associations with the other experience measures, 
it may be the case that bribery is not seen as a problem, or a constraint, per se.  
<TABLE 3 HERE> 
<TABLE 4 HERE> 
Thus we have some evidence that the two modes of investment are different from each other 
with regards to their association with corruption indicators. While M&A responds to perceptions 
of corruption, greenfield may be driven more by the actual degree to which corruption is a 
hindrance to firms on the ground. Once again this has some interesting implications for 
policymakers as there may be some role for actual improvements in corruption to play a role. 
Countries that make corruption less of an obstacle for firms may see some additional greenfield 
FDI even if the perception of corruption in their country remains unchanged.  
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has shown that perceptions of corruption in a country can differ substantially from 
firms’ experiences of corruption and, as things stand now, it is perceptions that seem to be 
associated with the amount of FDI that a country attracts in general. While others have shown 
that improvements in perceptions measures matter, we add a new dimension to the policy 
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prescription by showing that improving the reality of corruption, holding perceptions constant, 
does not seem to be related to any benefit in terms of overall FDI. However, we did find some 
evidence that reality may dominate perceptions when it comes to greenfield investment. We do 
not consider here whether the experience on the ground has any effect on perceptions measures 
as this is an important question that warrants a full and careful analysis. However, we have seen 
that the two concepts are not very strongly correlated and Treisman (2007) has shown that the 
two are correlated with different factors. 
 
As experience based measures become more well-known and expand in their country coverage 
these relationships may change but for now our findings imply that governments interested in 
attracting FDI would do well to improve their standing with regards to perceptions based 
measures like the Corruption Perceptions Index even if this improvement is not associated with 
an improvement in the reality of corruption. Perceptions, especially unfavourable ones, can be 
hard to change if they are based on cultural biases and expectations, and so another implication is 
that governments and policymakers should contest the weight given to certain indicators. Many 
countries have made the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business statistics part of their marketing 
strategy and perhaps something similar could be done with regards to corruption. It will be 
interesting to revisit these issues again in the future not only due to the fact that the relationships 
may change but also because the continuation of the Enterprise Surveys over time will allow one 
to employ methods that can help to make strong arguments for causality. Investors and managers 
may also be interested in our findings in that they suggest that the experience of firms on the 
ground can be different from the perceptions based information that they seem to be using to 
inform their investment decisions.  
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1: DESCRIPTION OF MAIN VARIABLES 
 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent variables 
  
Log (Net FDI Inflow) 
Natural logarithm of foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, constant 
2005 US$) 
UNCTAD 
Log (Value of Greenfield 
Investment) 
Natural logarithm of the value of greenfield investments (new investments 
built from zero), net  (constant 2005 US$) 
UNCTAD 
Log (Value of Crossborder M&A 
sales) 
Natural logarithm of the value of merger and acquisitions sales, net sales 
(constant 2005 US$) 
UNCTAD 
Controls 
 
 
Log (GDP) Natural logarithm of GDP (BoP, constant 2005 US$) WDI 
Imports Imports of goods and services  (BoP, constant 2005 US$) WDI 
Exports Exports of goods and services  (BoP, constant 2005 US$) WDI 
Log (Population) Natural logarithm of population   WDI 
Log (Skill Level) Natural logarithm of expected years of schooling UNDP 
Log(Inverse of Openness) log(GDP/Import+Exports), (BoP, constant 2005 US$) Constructed 
Log(Surrounding Market Potential) Natural logarithm of distance weighted sum of global GDPs Constructed 
Landlocked Dummy 1 if country is land locked, 0 otherwise CEPII 
Island Dummy 1 if country is an island, 0 otherwise Constructed 
Low Income Dummy 
1 if country is classified as low income (GNI per capita 1 035 US$ or less), 0 
otherwise 
World Bank, 
constructed  
Lower Middle Income Dummy 
1 if country is classified as lower middle income (GNI per capita from 1 036 
to 4 085 US$), 0 otherwise 
World Bank, 
constructed  
Perceptions of Corruption 
 
CPI 
Corruption Perceptions Index, ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly 
clean) 
Transparency 
International 
Experience Based Measures of 
Corruption 
 
 
Bribery depth (percent of public transactions where a gift or informal payment was requested) 
Enterprise 
Surveys (World 
Bank and IFC) 
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to public officials "to get things done"  
Percent of firms identifying corruption as a major constraint 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF KEY VARIABLES 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source 
Log (Net FDI Inflow) 218 6.444386 2.07377 -3.486542 11.54239 
United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) 
Log (Value of Greenfield Investment) 178 7.002563 1.954534 -0.1371105 11.21719 
United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) 
Log (Value of Crossborder M&A sales) 138 5.09026 2.58637 -0.87707 10.7685 
United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) 
Perceptions of Corruption 
    
 
Corruption Perceptions Index (0 - 10) 214 3.385981 1.333705 1.5 8.2 Transparency International 
Experience Based Measures of Corruption 
     
 
Percent of firms identifying corruption as a major 
constraint 
235 33.3183 19.74747 0 83.7 
 Enterprise Surveys (World 
Bank and IFC) 
Bribery depth (percent of public transactions where a 
gift or informal payment was requested) 
165 14.89879 14.81908 0 65.2 
 Enterprise Surveys (World 
Bank and IFC) 
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to public 
officials "to get things done"  
230 30.55174 21.97043 0 87 
 Enterprise Surveys (World 
Bank and IFC) 
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TABLE 2: Main Results 
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Net FDI Inflows     
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Constant -19.03*** -17.48*** -19.89*** -16.34*** -17.87*** -17.51*** -18.50*** -19.42*** -17.88*** 
 
(4.357) (4.850) (4.702) (5.970) (5.938) (4.953) (4.711) (5.012) (6.015)    
Corruption Perceptions Index (0 - 10) 0.219*** 
 
0.242*** 
 
0.206** 
 
0.202** 0.225*** 0.207* 
 
(0.0611) 
 
(0.0631) 
 
(0.0972) 
 
(0.0785) (0.0778) (0.105)    
Percent of firms identifying corruption as 
 
-0.00229 0.00370 
    
0.00399 0.000282    
a major constraint 
 
(0.00441) (0.00457) 
    
(0.00461) (0.00524)    
Bribery Depth 
   
-0.00159 0.00165 
   
0.00162    
 
   
(0.00672) (0.00733) 
   
(0.00733)    
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to   
     
-0.00718* -0.00407 -0.00429              
public officials "to get things done" 
     
(0.00405) (0.00456) (0.00472)              
Natural Log of  Inverse Openness -0.751*** -0.682** -0.772** -0.674** -0.733** -0.762** -0.824** -0.848** -0.736** 
 
(0.285) (0.288) (0.300) (0.339) (0.345) (0.343) (0.345) (0.362) (0.368)    
Natural Log of Population 0.967*** 0.907*** 0.973*** 0.890*** 0.956*** 0.923*** 0.983*** 0.989*** 0.957*** 
 
(0.0673) (0.0651) (0.0698) (0.0809) (0.0894) (0.0718) (0.0754) (0.0777) (0.0947)    
Natural Log of Surrounding Market Potential 0.340* 0.332 0.369* 0.293 0.279 0.351* 0.325* 0.358 0.280    
 
(0.180) (0.203) (0.187) (0.259) (0.245) (0.212) (0.194) (0.201) (0.246)    
Natural Log of Skill Level 1.012** 1.233*** 0.955** 1.247** 1.208** 1.017** 0.911* 0.847* 1.200*   
 
(0.449) (0.446) (0.450) (0.521) (0.535) (0.461) (0.465) (0.473) (0.542)    
Low Income Dummy -1.853*** -2.054*** -1.852*** -2.059*** -1.841*** -2.023*** -1.866*** -1.863*** -1.842*** 
 
(0.327) (0.324) (0.330) (0.392) (0.399) (0.332) (0.340) (0.343) (0.406)    
Lower Middle Income Dummy -0.853*** -1.078*** -0.866*** -1.131*** -0.900*** -1.083*** -0.886*** -0.900*** -0.901*** 
 
(0.219) (0.202) (0.221) (0.251) (0.283) (0.214) (0.234) (0.236) (0.285)    
Landlocked Dummy -0.584*** -0.701*** -0.538*** -0.710*** -0.656** -0.674*** -0.593*** -0.544*** -0.653*** 
 
(0.215) (0.206) (0.203) (0.261) (0.264) (0.216) (0.221) (0.206) (0.246)    
Island Dummy -0.218 0.0572 -0.190 0.00146 -0.297 -0.00880 -0.291 -0.264 -0.295    
 
(0.292) (0.407) (0.281) (0.416) (0.302) (0.430) (0.308) (0.295) (0.307)    
R2 0.738 0.719 0.738 0.686 0.699 0.713 0.727 0.727 0.697    
N 151 153 151 117 115 150 148 148 115 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 3: GREENFIELD INVESTMENTS AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Value of Greenfield Investments 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Constant -20.21*** -16.82*** -16.36*** -18.99*** -20.45*** -21.61*** -21.20*** -17.36*** -17.84** 
 
(5.086) (5.410) (5.662) (5.948) (6.448) (5.262) (5.241) (5.878) (7.023)    
Corruption Perceptions Index (0 - 10) 0.153** 
 
0.0552 
 
0.250** 
 
0.192** 0.0882 0.123    
 
(0.0643) 
 
(0.0694) 
 
(0.0968) 
 
(0.0856) (0.0937) (0.104)    
Percent of firms identifying corruption as 
 
-0.0169*** -0.0144*** 
    
-0.0141** -0.0171*** 
a major constraint 
 
(0.00491) (0.00529) 
    
(0.00542) (0.00640)    
Bribery Depth 
   
0.00285 0.0101 
   
0.0110    
 
   
(0.00783) (0.00850) 
   
(0.00783)    
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to   
     
-0.00105 0.00243 0.00138              
public officials "to get things done" 
     
(0.00570) (0.00660) (0.00640)              
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.625 0.659 0.643 0.596 0.594 0.621 0.617 0.635 0.618    
N 150 152 150 115 113 148 146 146 113 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include the control variables from Table 2. 
 
TABLE 4: CROSS-BORDER M&A SALES AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Value of Crossborder M&A sales 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Constant -28.47*** -23.23** -28.92** -17.94 -19.89 -27.74*** -30.11*** -30.44** -20.08    
 
(10.24) (10.83) (11.28) (13.06) (14.13) (10.40) (11.10) (12.13) (14.71)    
Corruption Perceptions Index (0 - 10) 0.496*** 
 
0.506*** 
 
0.363 
 
0.585*** 0.592*** 0.371    
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.187) 
 
(0.234) 
 
(0.194) (0.213) (0.260)    
Percent of firms identifying corruption as 
 
-0.0170 0.00178 
    
0.00128 0.00149    
a major constraint 
 
(0.0123) (0.0128) 
    
(0.0129) (0.0167)    
Bribery Depth 
   
-0.00323 0.00228 
   
0.00171    
 
   
(0.0201) (0.0212) 
   
(0.0226)    
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to   
     
0.0137* 0.0249* 0.0248              
public officials "to get things done" 
     
(0.0129) (0.0145) (0.0146)              
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.470 0.431 0.464 0.328 0.344 0.404 0.454 0.448 0.333    
N 105 107 105 75 73 104 102 102 73 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include the control variables from Table 2. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 See http://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/wir2013chMethodNote_en.pdf.  
2 The CPI score was changed to range from a scale of 0-100 in 2012, but for the purposes of this study we converted the 2012 and 2013 scores to the previous 0 to10 
scale.  
3 http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/in_detail/. 
4 As an alternative perceptions based measure of corruption we us the Control of Corruption (CC) variable from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset. 
CC ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 and is a composite index of surveys on households and firms as well as expert views from different organizations. The WGI indicators 
methodology as defined by Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) describes CC as measuring “the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.” Despite aggregating its source data in a more complicated way, 
CC tells a very similar story to the CPI as the two are econometrically very similar with a correlation of 0.92. Using this variable does not change our findings and the 
results are available on request. 
5 See http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology for the full methodology. 
6 The groups on the maps show the most recent observation and a country is included in the map only if there were both the survey and perception measures available for 
the same year. 
7 It is important to note here that our sample average for the CPI is rather low (3.3 out of 10)  since we are missing Enterprise Surveys information on most of the least 
corrupt countries in the world such as the Nordic countries and New Zealand. 
8 Our results are robust to using net inflow of FDI per capita as the dependent variable and alternative FDI inflow data from World Bank Development Indicators (WDI). 
9 Using the trade component of the Doing Business project as our measure of trade costs as is done in Corcoran and Gillanders (2015) does not change the results. 
10 See http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
